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fixup! e2ee/device verification: move general error handling under framework
Signed-off-by: Sumner Evans <sumner.evans@automattic.com>
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@ -602,27 +602,27 @@ package naming convention.
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At any point the interactive verification can go wrong. The following describes
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what to do when an error happens:
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- Alice or Bob can cancel the verification at any time. An
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[`m.key.verification.cancel`](#mkeyverificationcancel) message must be sent to
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signify the cancellation.
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- The verification can time out. Clients should time out a verification that
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does not complete within 10 minutes. Additionally, clients should expire a
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`transaction_id` which goes unused for 10 minutes after having last
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sent/received it. The client should inform the user that the verification
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timed out, and send an appropriate
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[`m.key.verification.cancel`](#mkeyverificationcancel) message to the other
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device.
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- When the same device attempts to initiate multiple verification attempts,
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the recipient should cancel all attempts with that device.
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- When a device receives an unknown `transaction_id`, it should send an
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appropriate [`m.key.verification.cancel`](#mkeyverificationcancel) message to
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the other device indicating as such. This does not apply for inbound
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[`m.key.verification.request`](#mkeyverificationrequest),
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[`m.key.verification.start`](#mkeyverificationstart), or
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[`m.key.verification.cancel`](#mkeyverificationcancel) messages.
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- If the device receives a message out of sequence or that it was not expecting,
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it should notify the other device with an appropriate
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[`m.key.verification.cancel`](#mkeyverificationcancel) message.
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- Alice or Bob can cancel the verification at any time. An
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[`m.key.verification.cancel`](#mkeyverificationcancel) message must be sent
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to signify the cancellation.
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- The verification can time out. Clients should time out a verification that
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does not complete within 10 minutes. Additionally, clients should expire a
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`transaction_id` which goes unused for 10 minutes after having last
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sent/received it. The client should inform the user that the verification
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timed out, and send an appropriate
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[`m.key.verification.cancel`](#mkeyverificationcancel) message to the other
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device.
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- When the same device attempts to initiate multiple verification attempts,
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the recipient should cancel all attempts with that device.
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- When a device receives an unknown `transaction_id`, it should send an
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appropriate [`m.key.verification.cancel`](#mkeyverificationcancel) message
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to the other device indicating as such. This does not apply for inbound
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[`m.key.verification.request`](#mkeyverificationrequest),
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[`m.key.verification.start`](#mkeyverificationstart), or
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[`m.key.verification.cancel`](#mkeyverificationcancel) messages.
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- If the device receives a message out of sequence or that it was not
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expecting, it should notify the other device with an appropriate
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[`m.key.verification.cancel`](#mkeyverificationcancel) message.
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##### Short Authentication String (SAS) verification
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@ -749,8 +749,9 @@ devices:
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###### Error handling during SAS verification
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At any point the interactive verification can go wrong. The following
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describes what to do when an error happens:
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At any point the interactive verification can go wrong. In addition to the
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[Error handling during key verification](#error-handling-during-key-verification) The following describes
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what to do when an error happens:
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- If the two devices do not share a common key share, hash, HMAC, or
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SAS method then the device should notify the other device with an
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