mirror of
https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec
synced 2025-12-25 18:38:37 +01:00
Add line, britishise
This commit is contained in:
parent
3877724774
commit
96e06b6f5f
|
|
@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ Further considered solutions are explored in
|
|||
https://signal.org/blog/contact-discovery/. Signal's eventual solution of
|
||||
using Software Guard Extensions (detailed in
|
||||
https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/) is considered impractical
|
||||
for a federated network, as it requires specialized hardware.
|
||||
for a federated network, as it requires specialised hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
k-anonymity was considered as an alternative approach, in which the identity
|
||||
server would never receive a full hash of a 3PID that it did not already know
|
||||
|
|
@ -410,10 +410,12 @@ Thus the conclusion is that while k-anon is harder to attack, it's unclear
|
|||
that this is actually enough of an obstacle to meaningfully stop a malicious
|
||||
IS. Therefore we should KISS and go for a simple hash lookup with a rotating
|
||||
pepper (which is not much harder than a static pepper, especially if our
|
||||
initial implementation doesn't bother rotating the pepper). Rather than trying
|
||||
to make the k-anon approach work, we'd be better off spending that time
|
||||
figuring out how to store 3pids as hashes in the DB (and in 3pid bindings
|
||||
etc), or how to decentralise ISes in general.
|
||||
initial implementation doesn't bother rotating the pepper). Rather than
|
||||
trying to make the k-anon approach work, we'd be better off spending that
|
||||
time figuring out how to store 3pids as hashes in the DB (and in 3pid
|
||||
bindings etc), or how to decentralise ISes in general. It's also worth noting
|
||||
that a malicious server may fail to rotate the pepper, making the rotation
|
||||
logic of questionable benefit.
|
||||
|
||||
A radical model was also considered where the first portion of the
|
||||
k-anonyminity scheme was done with an identity server, and the second would
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue