Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Johannes Marbach <n0-0ne+github@mailbox.org>
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Richard van der Hoff 2026-06-17 18:33:48 +01:00 committed by GitHub
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@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ keys to Bob via an [`m.room_key`](#mroom_key) message, she sets
If the history visibility changes in a way that would affect the
`shared_history` flag (i.e., it changes from `joined` or `invited` to `shared`
or `world_readable`, or vice versa), then clients MUST rotate their outbound
megolm session before sending more messages.
Megolm session before sending more messages.
Clients SHOULD show a visual indication to users that their encrypted messages
may be shared with future room members in this way.
@ -1651,7 +1651,7 @@ significant amounts of encrypted content with an attacker-controlled device.
When Bob's client receives an `m.room_key_bundle` event from Alice, there are two possibilities:
* If Bob has recently accepted an invite to the room from Alice, the client
should immediately download and decrypt the key bundle and start processing
SHOULD immediately download and decrypt the key bundle and start processing
it. Note, however, that this process must be resilient to Bob's client being
restarted before the download/import completes.
@ -1661,7 +1661,7 @@ When Bob's client receives an `m.room_key_bundle` event from Alice, there are tw
of attempting to download a key bundle on every startup. 24 hours is a
recommended time limit.)
* Otherwise, Bob's client should store the details of the key bundle but not
* Otherwise, Bob's client SHOULD store the details of the key bundle but not
download it immediately. If he later accepts an invite to the room from
Alice, his client downloads and processes the bundle at that point.