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change version from string to integer, plus other minor improvements
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@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ Example:
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On success, returns a JSON object with keys:
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On success, returns a JSON object with keys:
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- `version` (integer): the backup version
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- `version` (string): the backup version
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##### `GET /room_keys/version/{version}`
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##### `GET /room_keys/version/{version}`
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@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ On success, returns a JSON object with keys:
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/room_keys/version`.
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/room_keys/version`.
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- `auth_data` (object): Required. Same as in the body parameters for
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- `auth_data` (object): Required. Same as in the body parameters for
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`POST /room_keys/version`.
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`POST /room_keys/version`.
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- `version` (integer): Required. The backup version.
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- `version` (string): Required. The backup version.
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Error codes:
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Error codes:
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@ -275,9 +275,6 @@ The JSON object is then encrypted by generating an ephemeral curve25519 key,
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performing an ECDH with the ephemeral key and the backup's public key to
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performing an ECDH with the ephemeral key and the backup's public key to
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generate an AES key, and encrypting the stringified object using AES.
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generate an AES key, and encrypting the stringified object using AES.
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Tradeoffs
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---------
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Security Considerations
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Security Considerations
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-----------------------
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-----------------------
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@ -286,7 +283,8 @@ key backup. This proposal does not attempt to protect against that.
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An attacker who gains access to a user's account can create a new backup
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An attacker who gains access to a user's account can create a new backup
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version using a key that they control. For this reason, clients SHOULD confirm
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version using a key that they control. For this reason, clients SHOULD confirm
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with users before sending keys to a new backup version.
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with users before sending keys to a new backup version or verify that it was
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created by a trusted device by checking the signature.
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Other Issues
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Other Issues
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------------
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------------
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@ -299,3 +297,7 @@ backup requests randomly.
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Conclusion
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Conclusion
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----------
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----------
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This proposal allows users to securely and conveniently back up and restore
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their decryption keys so that users logging into a new device can decrypt old
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messages.
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