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Co-Authored-By: Richard van der Hoff <1389908+richvdh@users.noreply.github.com>
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Travis Ralston 2019-06-07 08:01:17 -06:00 committed by GitHub
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2
event-schemas/schema/m.key.verification.accept
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ properties:
type: string
enum: ["m.sas.v1"]
description: |-
The verification method to use. Must be ``m.sas.v1``.
The verification method to use.
key_agreement_protocol:
type: string
description: |-

16
specification/modules/end_to_end_encryption.rst
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@ -536,15 +536,15 @@ The process between Alice and Bob verifying each other would be:
.. |AlicePublicKey| replace:: :math:`K_{A}^{public}`
.. |AlicePrivateKey| replace:: :math:`K_{A}^{private}`
.. |AliceCurve25519| replace:: :math:`K_{A}^{private}K_{A}^{public}`
.. |AliceCurve25519| replace:: :math:`K_{A}^{private},K_{A}^{public}`
.. |BobPublicKey| replace:: :math:`K_{B}^{public}`
.. |BobPrivateKey| replace:: :math:`K_{B}^{private}`
.. |BobCurve25519| replace:: :math:`K_{B}^{private}K_{B}^{public}`
.. |BobCurve25519| replace:: :math:`K_{B}^{private},K_{B}^{public}`
.. |AliceBobCurve25519| replace:: :math:`K_{A}^{private}K_{B}^{public}`
.. |BobAliceCurve25519| replace:: :math:`K_{B}^{private}K_{A}^{public}`
.. |AliceBobECDH| replace:: :math:`ECDH(K_{A}^{private},K_{B}^{public})`
1. Alice and Bob establish a secure connection, likely meeting in-person. "Secure"
1. Alice and Bob establish a secure out-of-band connection, such as meeting in-person or a video call. "Secure"
here means that either party cannot be impersonated, not explicit secrecy.
#. Alice and Bob communicate which devices they'd like to verify with each other.
#. Alice selects Bob's device from the device list and begins verification.
@ -573,9 +573,9 @@ The process between Alice and Bob verifying each other would be:
methods are available, clients should allow the users to select a method.
#. Alice and Bob compare the strings shown by their devices, and tell their devices if
they match or not.
#. Assuming they match, Alice and Bob's devices calculate the HMAC of their own device
#. Assuming they match, Alice and Bob's devices calculate the HMAC of their own device keys
and a comma-separated sorted list of of the key IDs that they wish the other user
to verify. HMAC is defined in RFC 2104, and SHA-256 as the hash function. The key for
to verify, using SHA-256 as the hash function. HMAC is defined in [RFC 2104](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104). The key for
the HMAC is different for each item and is calculated by generating 32 bytes (256 bits)
using `the key verification HKDF <#SAS-HKDF>`_.
#. Alice's device sends Bob's device a ``m.key.verification.mac`` message containing the
@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ At any point the interactive verfication can go wrong. The following describes w
to do when an error happens:
* Alice or Bob can cancel the verification at any time. A ``m.key.verification.cancel``
message must be sent to signify the cancelation.
message must be sent to signify the cancellation.
* The verification can time out. Clients should time out a verification that does not
complete within 5 minutes. Additionally, clients should expire a ``transaction_id``
which goes unused for 5 minutes after having last sent/received it. The client should
@ -668,8 +668,8 @@ are used in addition to those already specified:
HKDF calculation
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
In all of the SAS methods, HKDF is as defined in RFC 5869 and uses the previously
agreed upon hash function for the hash function. The shared secret is supplied
In all of the SAS methods, HKDF is as defined in [RFC 5869](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869) and uses the previously
agreed-upon hash function for the hash function. The shared secret is supplied
as the input keying material. No salt is used, and the input parameter is the
concatenation of: