Merge f0affdfa3c into fda3be5ee3

Add note where an endpoint uses capability negotiation (#2223 )
Spec device ID masquerading (#2221 )
2026-04-22 10:44:10 +02:00 · 2025-10-11 23:58:15 +00:00 · 2025-10-08 16:32:44 +01:00 · 2025-10-08 16:52:18 +03:00 · 2025-09-17 22:23:32 +02:00 · 2025-08-03 18:21:35 +02:00
16 changed files with 104 additions and 61 deletions
--- a/changelogs/application_service/newsfragments/2221.feature
+++ b/changelogs/application_service/newsfragments/2221.feature
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Allow application services to masquerade as specific devices belonging to users, as per [MSC4326](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4326).
--- a/changelogs/client_server/newsfragments/2188.clarification
+++ b/changelogs/client_server/newsfragments/2188.clarification
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Clarify terminology for keys in cross-signing module.
--- a/changelogs/client_server/newsfragments/2221.feature
+++ b/changelogs/client_server/newsfragments/2221.feature
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Allow application services to masquerade as specific devices belonging to users, as per [MSC4326](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4326).
--- a/changelogs/client_server/newsfragments/2223.clarification
+++ b/changelogs/client_server/newsfragments/2223.clarification
@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Add note to each endpoint that uses capability negotiation.
--- a/content/application-service-api.md
+++ b/content/application-service-api.md
@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ service would like to masquerade as.
 Inputs:
 -   Application service token (`as_token`)
 -   User ID in the AS namespace to act as.
+-   Device ID belonging to the User ID to act with.

 Notes:
 -   This applies to all aspects of the Client-Server API, except for
@ -375,9 +376,19 @@ service's `user` namespaces. If the parameter is missing, the homeserver
 is to assume the application service intends to act as the user implied
 by the `sender_localpart` property of the registration.

+{{% added-in v="1.17" %}} Application services MAY similarly masquerade
+as a specific device ID belonging the user ID through use of the `device_id`
+query string parameter on the request. If the given device ID is not known
+to belong to the user, the server will return a 400 `M_UNKNOWN_DEVICE` error.
+If no `user_id` is supplied, the `device_id` MUST belong to the user implied
+by the `sender_localpart` property of the application service's registration.
+If no `device_id` is supplied, the homeserver is to assume the request is
+being made without a device ID and will fail to complete operations which
+require a device ID (such as uploading one-time keys).
+
 An example request would be:

-    GET /_matrix/client/v3/account/whoami?user_id=@_irc_user:example.org
+    GET /_matrix/client/v3/account/whoami?user_id=@_irc_user:example.org&device_id=ABC123
    Authorization: Bearer YourApplicationServiceTokenHere

 #### Timestamp massaging
--- a/content/client-server-api/_index.md
+++ b/content/client-server-api/_index.md
@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ The server did not understand the request. This is expected to be returned with
 a 404 HTTP status code if the endpoint is not implemented or a 405 HTTP status
 code if the endpoint is implemented, but the incorrect HTTP method is used.

+`M_UNKNOWN_DEVICE`
+{{% added-in v="1.17" %}} The device ID supplied by the application service does
+not belong to the user ID during [identity assertion](/application-service-api/#identity-assertion).
+
 `M_UNKNOWN`
 An unknown error has occurred.

--- a/content/client-server-api/modules/end_to_end_encryption.md
+++ b/content/client-server-api/modules/end_to_end_encryption.md
@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Example:
 ```

 `ed25519` and `curve25519` keys are used for [device keys](#device-keys).
-Additionally, `ed25519` keys are used for [cross-signing keys](#cross-signing).
+Additionally, `ed25519` keys are used for [cross-signing](#cross-signing).

 `signed_curve25519` keys are used for [one-time and fallback keys](#one-time-and-fallback-keys).

@ -675,7 +675,7 @@ The process between Alice and Bob verifying each other would be:
 15. Assuming they match, Alice and Bob's devices each calculate Message
    Authentication Codes (MACs) for:
    * Each of the keys that they wish the other user to verify (usually their
-      device ed25519 key and their master cross-signing key).
+      device ed25519 key and their master key, see below).
    * The complete list of key IDs that they wish the other user to verify.

    The MAC calculation is defined [below](#mac-calculation).
@ -931,16 +931,16 @@ and can be translated online:
 Rather than requiring Alice to verify each of Bob's devices with each of
 her own devices and vice versa, the cross-signing feature allows users
 to sign their device keys such that Alice and Bob only need to verify
-once. With cross-signing, each user has a set of cross-signing keys that
+once. With cross-signing, each user has a set of ed25519 key pairs that
 are used to sign their own device keys and other users' keys, and can be
 used to trust device keys that were not verified directly.

-Each user has three ed25519 key pairs for cross-signing:
+Each user has three ed25519 key pairs used for cross-signing:

-   a master key (MSK) that serves as the user's identity in
-    cross-signing and signs their other cross-signing keys;
+-   a master key (MK) that serves as the user's identity in
+    cross-signing and signs their user-signing and self-signing keys;
 -   a user-signing key (USK) -- only visible to the user that it belongs
-    to --that signs other users' master keys; and
+    to -- that signs other users' master keys; and
 -   a self-signing key (SSK) that signs the user's own device keys.

 The master key may also be used to sign other items such as the backup
@ -950,13 +950,15 @@ previously verified Bob's device and Bob's device has signed his master
 key, then Alice's device can trust Bob's master key, and she can sign it
 with her user-signing key.

-Users upload their cross-signing keys to the server using [POST
+Users upload the public part of their master, user-signing and self-signing
+key to the server using [POST
 /\_matrix/client/v3/keys/device\_signing/upload](/client-server-api/#post_matrixclientv3keysdevice_signingupload). When Alice uploads
-new cross-signing keys, her user ID will appear in the `changed`
+new keys, her user ID will appear in the `changed`
 property of the `device_lists` field of the `/sync` of response of all
 users who share an encrypted room with her. When Bob sees Alice's user
 ID in his `/sync`, he will call [POST /\_matrix/client/v3/keys/query](/client-server-api/#post_matrixclientv3keysquery)
-to retrieve Alice's device and cross-signing keys.
+to retrieve Alice's device keys, as well as their master, user-signing and
+self-signing key.

 If Alice has a device and wishes to send an encrypted message to Bob,
 she can trust Bob's device if:
@ -971,13 +973,13 @@ The following diagram illustrates how keys are signed:

 ```
    +------------------+                ..................   +----------------+
-    | +--------------+ |   ..................            :   | +------------+ |
-    | |              v v   v            :   :            v   v v            | |
-    | |           +-----------+         :   :         +-----------+         | |
-    | |           | Alice MSK |         :   :         |  Bob MSK  |         | |
-    | |           +-----------+         :   :         +-----------+         | |
-    | |             |       :           :   :           :       |           | |
-    | |          +--+       :...        :   :        ...:       +--+        | |
+    | +--------------+ |  ...................            :   | +------------+ |
+    | |              v v  v             :   :            v   v v            | |
+    | |           +----------+          :   :         +----------+          | |
+    | |           | Alice MK |          :   :         |  Bob MK  |          | |
+    | |           +----------+          :   :         +----------+          | |
+    | |             |      :            :   :           :      |            | |
+    | |          +--+      :....        :   :        ...:      +---+        | |
    | |          v             v        :   :        v             v        | |
    | |    +-----------+ .............  :   :  ............. +-----------+  | |
    | |    | Alice SSK | : Alice USK :  :   :  :  Bob USK  : |  Bob SSK  |  | |
@ -1004,11 +1006,11 @@ signatures that she cannot see:
    +------------------+                +----------------+   +----------------+
    | +--------------+ |                |                |   | +------------+ |
    | |              v v                |                v   v v            | |
-    | |           +-----------+         |             +-----------+         | |
-    | |           | Alice MSK |         |             |  Bob MSK  |         | |
-    | |           +-----------+         |             +-----------+         | |
-    | |             |       |           |                       |           | |
-    | |          +--+       +--+        |                       +--+        | |
+    | |           +----------+          |             +----------+          | |
+    | |           | Alice MK |          |             |  Bob MK  |          | |
+    | |           +----------+          |             +----------+          | |
+    | |             |      |            |                      |            | |
+    | |          +--+      +---+        |                      +---+        | |
    | |          v             v        |                          v        | |
    | |    +-----------+ +-----------+  |                    +-----------+  | |
    | |    | Alice SSK | | Alice USK |  |                    |  Bob SSK  |  | |
@ -1024,16 +1026,16 @@ signatures that she cannot see:
 ```

 [Verification methods](#device-verification) can be used to verify a
-user's master key by using the master public key, encoded using unpadded
+user's master key by treating the master public key, encoded using unpadded
 base64, as the device ID, and treating it as a normal device. For
 example, if Alice and Bob verify each other using SAS, Alice's
 `m.key.verification.mac` message to Bob may include
 `"ed25519:alices+master+public+key": "alices+master+public+key"` in the
 `mac` property. Servers therefore must ensure that device IDs will not
-collide with cross-signing public keys.
+collide with public keys used for cross-signing.

-The cross-signing private keys can be stored on the server or shared with other
-devices using the [Secrets](#secrets) module.  When doing so, the master,
+Using the [Secrets](#secrets) module the private keys used for cross-signing can
+be stored on the server or shared with other devices.  When doing so, the master,
 user-signing, and self-signing keys are identified using the names
 `m.cross_signing.master`, `m.cross_signing.user_signing`, and
 `m.cross_signing.self_signing`, respectively, and the keys are base64-encoded
@ -1052,14 +1054,14 @@ If a user's client sees that any other user has changed their master
 key, that client must notify the user about the change before allowing
 communication between the users to continue.

-Since device key IDs (`ed25519:DEVICE_ID`) and cross-signing key IDs
-(`ed25519:PUBLIC_KEY`) occupy the same namespace, clients must ensure that they
-use the correct keys when verifying.
+Since device key IDs (`ed25519:DEVICE_ID`) as well as master, user-signing and
+self-signing key IDs (`ed25519:PUBLIC_KEY`) occupy the same namespace, clients
+must ensure that they use the correct keys when verifying.

-While servers MUST not allow devices to have the same IDs as cross-signing
-keys, a malicious server could construct such a situation, so clients must not
-rely on the server being well-behaved and should take the following precautions
-against this.
+While servers MUST not allow devices to have the same IDs as keys used for
+cross-signing, a malicious server could construct such a situation, so clients
+must not rely on the server being well-behaved and should take the following
+precautions against this:

 1. Clients MUST refer to keys by their public keys during the verification
   process, rather than only by the key ID.
@ -1067,7 +1069,8 @@ against this.
   verification process, and ensure that they do not change in the course of
   verification.
 3. Clients SHOULD also display a warning and MUST refuse to verify a user when
-   they detect that the user has a device with the same ID as a cross-signing key.
+   they detect that the user has a device with the same ID as a key used for
+   cross-signing.

 A user's user-signing and self-signing keys are intended to be easily
 replaceable if they are compromised by re-issuing a new key signed by
@ -1104,7 +1107,7 @@ user-signing keys.

 Verifying by QR codes provides a quick way to verify when one of the parties
 has a device capable of scanning a QR code. The QR code encodes both parties'
-master signing keys as well as a random shared secret that is used to allow
+master keys as well as a random shared secret that is used to allow
 bi-directional verification from a single scan.

 To advertise the ability to show a QR code, clients use the names
@ -1202,15 +1205,14 @@ The binary segment MUST be of the following form:
    bytes of the ID as a UTF-8 string
  - the ID encoded as a UTF-8 string
 - the first key, as 32 bytes.  The key to use depends on the mode field:
-  - if `0x00` or `0x01`, then the current user's own master cross-signing public key
+  - if `0x00` or `0x01`, then the current user's own master public key
  - if `0x02`, then the current device's Ed25519 signing key
 - the second key, as 32 bytes.  The key to use depends on the mode field:
  - if `0x00`, then what the device thinks the other user's master
-    cross-signing public key is
+    public key is
  - if `0x01`, then what the device thinks the other device's Ed25519 signing
    public key is
-  - if `0x02`, then what the device thinks the user's master cross-signing public
-    key is
+  - if `0x02`, then what the device thinks the user's master public key is
 - a random shared secret, as a sequence of bytes.  It is suggested to use a secret
  that is about 8 bytes long.  Note: as we do not share the length of the
  secret, and it is not a fixed size, clients will just use the remainder of
@ -1221,14 +1223,14 @@ For example, if Alice displays a QR code encoding the following binary data:
 ```
      "MATRIX"    |ver|mode| len   | event ID
 4D 41 54 52 49 58  02  00   00 2D   21 41 42 43 44 ...
-| user's cross-signing key    | other user's cross-signing key | shared secret
-  00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ...   10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 ...      20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
+| the first key               | the second key              | shared secret
+  00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ...   10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 ...   20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
 ```

-this indicates that Alice is verifying another user (say Bob), in response to
-the request from event "$ABCD...", her cross-signing key is
+Mode `0x00` indicates that Alice is verifying another user (say Bob), in
+response to the request from event "$ABCD...", her master key is
 `0001020304050607...` (which is "AAECAwQFBg..." in base64), she thinks that
-Bob's cross-signing key is `1011121314151617...` (which is "EBESExQVFh..." in
+Bob's master key is `1011121314151617...` (which is "EBESExQVFh..." in
 base64), and the shared secret is `2021222324252627` (which is "ICEiIyQlJic" in
 base64).

@ -1300,8 +1302,8 @@ one of its variants.
 Clients must only store keys in backups after they have ensured that the
 `auth_data` is trusted. This can be done either by:

- checking that it is signed by the user's [master cross-signing
-  key](#cross-signing) or by a verified device belonging to the same user, or
+- checking that it is signed by the user's [master key](#cross-signing)
+  or by a verified device belonging to the same user, or
 - deriving the public key from a private key that it obtained from a trusted
  source. Trusted sources for the private key include the user entering the
  key, retrieving the key stored in [secret storage](#secret-storage), or
@ -1786,13 +1788,14 @@ a way to identify the server's support for fallback keys.

 | Parameter  | Type      | Description                                                                                                                                                      |
 |------------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-| changed    | [string]  | List of users who have updated their device identity or cross-signing keys, or who now share an encrypted room with the client since the previous sync response. |
+| changed    | [string]  | List of users who have updated their device identity or their master, self-signing or user-signing keys, or who now share an encrypted room with the client since the previous sync response. |
 | left       | [string]  | List of users with whom we do not share any encrypted rooms anymore since the previous sync response.                                                            |

 {{% boxes/note %}}
 For optimal performance, Alice should be added to `changed` in Bob's
-sync only when she updates her devices or cross-signing keys, or when
-Alice and Bob now share a room but didn't share any room previously.
+sync only when she updates her devices or master, self-signing or
+user-signing keys, or when Alice and Bob now share a room but didn't
+share any room previously.
 However, for the sake of simpler logic, a server may add Alice to
 `changed` when Alice and Bob share a new room, even if they previously
 already shared a room.
--- a/data/api/client-server/administrative_contact.yaml
+++ b/data/api/client-server/administrative_contact.yaml
@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ paths:
        has been removed, making this endpoint behave as though it was `false`.
        This results in this endpoint being an equivalent to `/3pid/bind` rather
        than dual-purpose.
+
+        This endpoint uses [capabilities negotiation](/client-server-api/#capabilities-negotiation).
+        Clients SHOULD check the value of the [`m.3pid_changes` capability](/client-server-api/#m3pid_changes-capability)
+        to determine if this endpoint is available.
      operationId: post3PIDs
      deprecated: true
      security:
@ -202,6 +206,10 @@ paths:
        Homeservers should prevent the caller from adding a 3PID to their account if it has
        already been added to another user's account on the homeserver.

+        This endpoint uses [capabilities negotiation](/client-server-api/#capabilities-negotiation).
+        Clients SHOULD check the value of the [`m.3pid_changes` capability](/client-server-api/#m3pid_changes-capability)
+        to determine if this endpoint is available.
+
        {{% boxes/warning %}}
        Since this endpoint uses User-Interactive Authentication, it cannot be used when the access token was obtained
        via the [OAuth 2.0 API](/client-server-api/#oauth-20-api).
@ -331,6 +339,10 @@ paths:
        Unlike other endpoints, this endpoint does not take an `id_access_token`
        parameter because the homeserver is expected to sign the request to the
        identity server instead.
+
+        This endpoint uses [capabilities negotiation](/client-server-api/#capabilities-negotiation).
+        Clients SHOULD check the value of the [`m.3pid_changes` capability](/client-server-api/#m3pid_changes-capability)
+        to determine if this endpoint is available.
      operationId: delete3pidFromAccount
      security:
        - accessTokenQuery: []
--- a/data/api/client-server/cross_signing.yaml
+++ b/data/api/client-server/cross_signing.yaml
@ -21,16 +21,16 @@ paths:
      x-addedInMatrixVersion: "1.1"
      x-changedInMatrixVersion:
        "1.11": UIA is not always required for this endpoint.
-      summary: Upload cross-signing keys.
+      summary: Upload keys used for cross-signing.
      description: |-
-        Publishes cross-signing keys for the user.
+        Publishes keys used for cross-signing for the user.

        This API endpoint uses the [User-Interactive Authentication API](/client-server-api/#user-interactive-authentication-api).

        User-Interactive Authentication MUST be performed, except in these cases:
-        - there is no existing cross-signing master key uploaded to the homeserver, OR
-        - there is an existing cross-signing master key and it exactly matches the
-          cross-signing master key provided in the request body. If there are any additional
+        - there is no existing master key uploaded to the homeserver, OR
+        - there is an existing master key and it exactly matches the
+          master key provided in the request body. If there are any additional
          keys provided in the request (self-signing key, user-signing key) they MUST also
          match the existing keys stored on the server. In other words, the request contains
          no new keys.
--- a/data/api/client-server/definitions/cross_signing_key.yaml
+++ b/data/api/client-server/definitions/cross_signing_key.yaml
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 # limitations under the License.
 type: object
 title: CrossSigningKey
-description: Cross signing key
+description: Key used for cross signing
 properties:
  user_id:
    type: string
--- a/data/api/client-server/keys.yaml
+++ b/data/api/client-server/keys.yaml
@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ paths:
                    x-addedInMatrixVersion: "1.1"
                    type: object
                    description: |-
-                      Information on the master cross-signing keys of the queried users.
+                      Information on the master keys of the queried users.
                      A map from user ID, to master key information.  For each key, the
                      information returned will be the same as uploaded via
                      `/keys/device_signing/upload`, along with the signatures
--- a/data/api/client-server/password_management.yaml
+++ b/data/api/client-server/password_management.yaml
@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ paths:
        valid access token is provided. The homeserver SHOULD NOT revoke the
        access token provided in the request. Whether other access tokens for
        the user are revoked depends on the request parameters.
+
+        This endpoint uses [capabilities negotiation](/client-server-api/#capabilities-negotiation).
+        Clients SHOULD check the value of the [`m.change_password` capability](/client-server-api/#mchange_password-capability)
+        to determine if this endpoint is available.
      security:
        - {}
        - accessTokenQuery: []
--- a/data/api/client-server/profile.yaml
+++ b/data/api/client-server/profile.yaml
@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ paths:
        Servers MAY reject `null` values. Servers that accept `null` values SHOULD store
        them rather than treating `null` as a deletion request. Clients that want to delete a
        field, including its key and value, SHOULD use the `DELETE` endpoint instead.
+
+        This endpoint uses [capabilities negotiation](/client-server-api/#capabilities-negotiation)
+        depending on the `keyName`. Clients SHOULD check the value of the
+        [`m.profile_fields` capability](/client-server-api/#mprofile_fields-capability) to detect
+        which `keyName`s they are allowed to modify.
      operationId: setProfileField
      security:
        - accessTokenQuery: []
--- a/data/api/server-server/definitions/event-schemas/m.signing_key_update.yaml
+++ b/data/api/server-server/definitions/event-schemas/m.signing_key_update.yaml
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ type: object
 title: m.signing_key_update
 description: |-
  An EDU that lets servers push details to each other when one of their users
-  updates their cross-signing keys.
+  updates their keys used for cross-signing.
 allOf:
  - $ref: ../edu.yaml
  - type: object
@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ allOf:
        properties:
          user_id:
            type: string
-            description: The user ID whose cross-signing keys have changed.
+            description: The user ID whose keys have changed.
            example: "@alice:example.com"
          master_key:
            allOf:
--- a/data/api/server-server/user_devices.yaml
+++ b/data/api/server-server/user_devices.yaml
@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ paths:
                        - keys
                  master_key:
                    type: object
-                    description: The user\'s master cross-signing key.
+                    description: The user\'s master key.
                    allOf:
                      - $ref: ../client-server/definitions/cross_signing_key.yaml
                      - example:
--- a/data/api/server-server/user_keys.yaml
+++ b/data/api/server-server/user_keys.yaml
@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ paths:
                    x-addedInMatrixVersion: "1.1"
                    type: object
                    description: |-
-                      Information on the master cross-signing keys of the queried users.
+                      Information on the master keys of the queried users.
                      A map from user ID, to master key information.  For each key, the
                      information returned will be the same as uploaded via
                      `/keys/device_signing/upload`, along with the signatures
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
codedust	08294f87af	Merge `f0affdfa3c` into `fda3be5ee3`	2025-10-11 23:58:15 +00:00
Hugh Nimmo-Smith	fda3be5ee3	Add note where an endpoint uses capability negotiation (#2223 ) Some checks failed Spec / 🔎 Validate OpenAPI specifications (push) Has been cancelled Details Spec / 🔎 Check Event schema examples (push) Has been cancelled Details Spec / 🔎 Check OpenAPI definitions examples (push) Has been cancelled Details Spec / 🔎 Check JSON Schemas inline examples (push) Has been cancelled Details Spec / ⚙️ Calculate baseURL for later jobs (push) Has been cancelled Details Spec / 📢 Run towncrier for changelog (push) Has been cancelled Details Spell Check / Spell Check with Typos (push) Has been cancelled Details Spec / 🐍 Build OpenAPI definitions (push) Has been cancelled Details Spec / 📖 Build the spec (push) Has been cancelled Details Spec / 🔎 Validate generated HTML (push) Has been cancelled Details Spec / 📖 Build the historical backup spec (push) Has been cancelled Details	2025-10-08 16:32:44 +01:00
Travis Ralston	7f4072d993	Spec device ID masquerading (#2221 )	2025-10-08 16:52:18 +03:00
codedust	f0affdfa3c	docs: grammar fix Co-authored-by: Richard van der Hoff <1389908+richvdh@users.noreply.github.com>	2025-09-17 22:23:32 +02:00
codedust	f42ce28bfe	Clarify terminology for keys in cross-signing module - do not use the term 'cross-signing keys' anymore: Previously, the term 'cross-signing keys' was used to refer to the master, user-signing and self-signing keys. This is not ideal since the master key is used for cross-signing but may also be used to sign the backup key, for example. In these contexts, the master key is not used for cross-signing. The term 'cross-signing keys' has therefor been replaced by 'keys used for cross-signing' or, more explicitely, by 'master, user-signing and self-signing key'. - the naming of the master key has been harmonised (no more 'master cross-signing key' or 'master signing keys'). Also the abbr. 'MSK' has been replaced by 'MK'. - in the QR code example, the term 'cross-signing key' has been replaced by 'master key' since in mode 0x00, the current user's own master key and what the device thinks the other user's master key is used. - it has been made more explicit that private keys used for cross-signing can be stored on the server are stored as described in the secrets module (as opposed to store them in unencrypted form) Signed-off-by: codedust <codedust@so.urceco.de>	2025-08-03 18:21:35 +02:00
				`@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`Allow application services to masquerade as specific devices belonging to users, as per [MSC4326](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4326).`
				`@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`Clarify terminology for keys in cross-signing module.`
				`@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`Add note to each endpoint that uses capability negotiation.`