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@ -1484,34 +1484,30 @@ the Policy Server for a signature too.
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When a server receives an event over federation from another server, the
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receiving server should check the hashes and signatures on that event.
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First the signature is checked. The event is redacted following the
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[redaction
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algorithm](/client-server-api#redactions), and
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the resultant object is checked for a signature from the originating
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First the signatures are checked. The event is redacted following the
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[redaction algorithm](/client-server-api#redactions), and
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the resultant object is checked for signatures from the originating
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server, following the algorithm described in [Checking for a
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signature](/appendices#checking-for-a-signature). Note that this
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step should succeed whether we have been sent the full event or a
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redacted copy.
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The signatures expected on an event are:
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For room versions 3 and later, unless the event is a 3rd party invite, only the
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signature(s) from the originating server (the server the `sender` belongs to)
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are required for verification. Room versions 1 and 2 also require that a
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signature is present from the domain in the `event_id`, if it differs from the
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originating server. If a signature is from an unknown or expired key, it is
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skipped.
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- The `sender`'s server, unless the invite was created as a result of
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3rd party invite. The sender must already match the 3rd party
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invite, and the server which actually sends the event may be a
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different server.
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- For room versions 1 and 2, the server which created the `event_id`.
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Other room versions do not track the `event_id` over federation and
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therefore do not need a signature from those servers.
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If the event is a 3rd party invite, the sender must already match the 3rd party
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invite, and the server which actually sends the event may be a different
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server.
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If the signature is found to be valid, the expected content hash is
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calculated as described below. The content hash in the `hashes` property
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of the received event is base64-decoded, and the two are compared for
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equality.
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If the hash check fails, then it is assumed that this is because we have
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only been given a redacted version of the event. To enforce this, the
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receiving server should use the redacted copy it calculated rather than
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the full copy it received.
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Only signatures from known server keys are validated here. Any unknown keys are ignored.
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In particular, the [policy server key](#validating-policy-server-signatures) is not
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expected to be published and therefore should be skipped at this stage.
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Additionally, any keys that are known to have expired prior to the event's
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`origin_server_ts` are ignored.
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{{% boxes/note %}}
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{{% added-in v="1.18" %}}
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@ -1519,6 +1515,16 @@ Events sent in rooms with [Policy Servers](#policy-servers) have [additional](#v
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signature validation requirements.
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{{% /boxes/note %}}
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If all signatures from known unexpired keys from the originating server(s) are
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found to be valid, the expected content hash is calculated as described below.
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The content hash in the `hashes` property of the received event is base64-decoded,
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and the two are compared for equality.
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If the hash check fails, then it is assumed that this is because we have
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only been given a redacted version of the event. To enforce this, the
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receiving server should use the redacted copy it calculated rather than
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the full copy it received.
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### Calculating the reference hash for an event
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The *reference hash* of an event covers the essential fields of an
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