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Add further normative language in mutual rooms server behaviour.
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1
changelogs/olm_megolm/newsfragments/2421.clarification
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1
changelogs/olm_megolm/newsfragments/2421.clarification
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Fix typesetting of some symbols in the Olm/Megolm spec.
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@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
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#### Server behaviour
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#### Server behaviour
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The server may decide that the response to this endpoint is too large, and only return a
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The server MAY decide that the response to this endpoint is too large, and only return a
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subset of the results. In this case, the server should populate the optional field `next_batch`
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subset of the results. In this case, the server populates the optional field `next_batch`
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with an [opaque identifier](/appendices/#opaque-identifiers). The client may then supply
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with an [opaque identifier](/appendices/#opaque-identifiers). The client can then supply
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the identifier as the `from` query parameter in a subsequent request, along with the original
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the identifier as the `from` query parameter in a subsequent request, along with the original
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`user_id`, to fetch the next batch of responses. This will continue until the server no longer
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`user_id`, to fetch the next batch of responses. This will continue until the server no longer
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inserts `next_batch`, meaning there are no further results.
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inserts `next_batch`, meaning there are no further results.
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@ -257,8 +257,8 @@ consists of the following key-value pairs:
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**Name**|**Tag**|**Type**|**Meaning**
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**Name**|**Tag**|**Type**|**Meaning**
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:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:
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:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:
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Message-Index|0x08|Integer|The index of the ratchet, i
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Message-Index|0x08|Integer|The index of the ratchet, \(i\).
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Cipher-Text|0x12|String|The cipher-text, Xi, of the message
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Cipher-Text|0x12|String|The cipher-text of the message, \(X_i\).
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Within the payload, integers are encoded using a variable length encoding. Each
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Within the payload, integers are encoded using a variable length encoding. Each
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integer is encoded as a sequence of bytes with the high bit set followed by a
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integer is encoded as a sequence of bytes with the high bit set followed by a
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@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ side of an \(=\) it means that the output is split.
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When this document uses \(\operatorname{ECDH}\left(K_A,K_B\right)\) it means
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When this document uses \(\operatorname{ECDH}\left(K_A,K_B\right)\) it means
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that each party computes a Diffie-Hellman agreement using their private key
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that each party computes a Diffie-Hellman agreement using their private key
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and the remote party's public key.
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and the remote party's public key.
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So party \(A\) computes \(\operatorname{ECDH}\left(K_B^{public},K_A^{private}\right)\)
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So party \(A\) computes \(\operatorname{ECDH}\left(K_B^{\mathit{public}},K_A^{\mathit{private}}\right)\)
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and party \(B\) computes \(\operatorname{ECDH}\left(K_A^{public},K_B^{private}\right)\).
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and party \(B\) computes \(\operatorname{ECDH}\left(K_A^{\mathit{public}},K_B^{\mathit{private}}\right)\).
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Where this document uses \(\operatorname{HKDF}\left(salt,IKM,info,L\right)\) it
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Where this document uses \(\operatorname{HKDF}\left(\mathit{salt},\mathit{IKM},\mathit{info},L\right)\) it
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refers to the [HMAC-based key derivation function][] with a salt value of
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refers to the [HMAC-based key derivation function][] with a salt value of
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\(salt\), input key material of \(IKM\), context string \(info\),
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\(\mathit{salt}\), input key material of \(\mathit{IKM}\), context string \(\mathit{info}\),
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and output keying material length of \(L\) bytes.
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and output keying material length of \(L\) bytes.
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## The Olm Algorithm
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## The Olm Algorithm
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@ -226,9 +226,9 @@ significant bits are stored in the first byte.
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**Name**|**Tag**|**Type**|**Meaning**
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**Name**|**Tag**|**Type**|**Meaning**
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:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:
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:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:
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Ratchet-Key|0x0A|String|The public part of the ratchet key, Ti, of the message
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Ratchet-Key|0x0A|String|The public part of the ratchet key of the message, \(T_i\).
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Chain-Index|0x10|Integer|The chain index, j, of the message
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Chain-Index|0x10|Integer|The chain index of the message, \(j\).
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Cipher-Text|0x22|String|The cipher-text, Xi, j, of the message
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Cipher-Text|0x22|String|The cipher-text of the message, \(X_{i,j}\).
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The length of the MAC is determined by the authenticated encryption algorithm
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The length of the MAC is determined by the authenticated encryption algorithm
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being used. (Olm version 1 uses [HMAC-SHA-256][], truncated to 8 bytes). The
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being used. (Olm version 1 uses [HMAC-SHA-256][], truncated to 8 bytes). The
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@ -251,9 +251,9 @@ The payload uses the same key-value format as for normal messages.
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**Name**|**Tag**|**Type**|**Meaning**
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**Name**|**Tag**|**Type**|**Meaning**
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:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:
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:-----:|:-----:|:-----:|:-----:
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One-Time-Key|0x0A|String|The public part of Bob's single-use key, Eb.
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One-Time-Key|0x0A|String|The public part of Bob's single-use key, \(E_B\).
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Base-Key|0x12|String|The public part of Alice's single-use key, Ea.
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Base-Key|0x12|String|The public part of Alice's single-use key, \(E_A\).
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Identity-Key|0x1A|String|The public part of Alice's identity key, Ia.
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Identity-Key|0x1A|String|The public part of Alice's identity key, \(I_A\).
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Message|0x22|String|An embedded Olm message with its own version and MAC.
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Message|0x22|String|An embedded Olm message with its own version and MAC.
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## Olm Authenticated Encryption
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## Olm Authenticated Encryption
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@ -268,13 +268,13 @@ message key using [HKDF-SHA-256][] using the default salt and an info of
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\[
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\[
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\begin{aligned}
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\begin{aligned}
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AES\_KEY_{i,j}\;\parallel\;HMAC\_KEY_{i,j}\;\parallel\;AES\_IV_{i,j}
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\mathit{AES\_KEY}_{i,j}\;\parallel\;\mathit{HMAC\_KEY}_{i,j}\;\parallel\;\mathit{AES\_IV}_{i,j}
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&= \operatorname{HKDF}\left(0,M_{i,j},\text{``OLM\_KEYS"},80\right)
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&= \operatorname{HKDF}\left(0,M_{i,j},\text{``OLM\_KEYS"},80\right)
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\end{aligned}
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\end{aligned}
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\]
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\]
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The plain-text is encrypted with AES-256, using the key \(AES\_KEY_{i,j}\)
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The plain-text is encrypted with AES-256, using the key \(\mathit{AES\_KEY}_{i,j}\)
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and the IV \(AES\_IV_{i,j}\) to give the cipher-text, \(X_{i,j}\).
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and the IV \(\mathit{AES\_IV}_{i,j}\) to give the cipher-text, \(X_{i,j}\).
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Then the entire message (including the Version Byte and all Payload Bytes) are
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Then the entire message (including the Version Byte and all Payload Bytes) are
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passed through [HMAC-SHA-256][]. The first 8 bytes of the MAC are appended to the message.
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passed through [HMAC-SHA-256][]. The first 8 bytes of the MAC are appended to the message.
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