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Author SHA1 Message Date
Kévin Commaille 42e8eedfb0
Merge 3ff21c357d into e9f219d53b 2026-01-27 12:00:03 +01:00

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@ -21,15 +21,14 @@ recommendations.
* Clients SHOULD create new [cross-signing keys](#cross-signing) for users who
do not yet have cross-signing keys.
* Clients SHOULD encourage users to set up their [Secret Storage](#storage) to
avoid needing to reset their cryptographic identity in case the user does not
have an existing device that can [share the secrets](#sharing) with the new
device. The user's Secret Storage SHOULD contain the user's cross-signing
private keys and the [key backup](#server-side-key-backups) decryption key
(if the user is using key backup). The user's Secret Storage SHOULD have a
[default key](#key-storage) (a key referred to by
`m.secret_storage.default_key`) that encrypts the private cross-signing keys
and key backup decryption key (if available).
* Users SHOULD have [Secret Storage](#storage) set up to avoid needing to reset
their cryptographic identity in case the user does not have an existing device
that can [share the secrets](#sharing) with the new device. The user's Secret
Storage SHOULD contain the user's cross-signing private keys and the [key
backup](#server-side-key-backups) decryption key (if the user is using key
backup). The user's Secret Storage SHOULD have a [default key](#key-storage)
(a key referred to by `m.secret_storage.default_key`) that encrypts the
private cross-signing keys and key backup decryption key (if available).
* Clients SHOULD encourage users to [cross-sign](#cross-signing) their devices.
This includes both when logging in a new device, and for existing devices.
Clients MAY even go so far as to require cross-signing of devices by
@ -60,11 +59,6 @@ recommendations.
[`m.room_key.withheld`](#mroom_keywithheld) message with a code of
`m.unverified` to indicate to the non-cross-signed device why it is not
receiving the room key.
Note that clients cannot selectively send room events only to cross-signed
devices. The only way to exclude non-cross-signed devices from encrypted
conversations is to not send the room keys so those devices won't be able to
decrypt the messages.
* Similarly, messages sent from [non-cross-signed](#cross-signing) devices
cannot be trusted and SHOULD NOT be displayed to the user. Clients have no
assurance that encrypted messages sent from non-cross-signed devices were sent
@ -86,9 +80,7 @@ recommendations.
a different user. Clients MAY accept such messages, provided the session
creator's device is [cross-signed](#cross-signing). However, the client MUST
annotate the message with a warning, unless the client has a way to check that
the bridge bot is permitted to encrypt messages on behalf of the user. Future
MSCs such as [MSC4350](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4350)
may provide a secure way to allow such impersonation.
the bridge bot is permitted to encrypt messages on behalf of the user.
#### Key Distribution